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Neo-liberal economie and political reforms in Africa have been the focus of a
considerable number of studies in the last two decades. Nevertheless, some con-
spicuous lacunae still exist in the growing body of literature. In their overview of
the literature on democratisation, Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot (1995) mention that
the role of certain civil-society organisations in economie and political
liberalisation, and trade unions in particular, has been understudied.
From the 1980s onwards, faced with a deep and prolonged economie crisis, virtu-
ally all African governments have been required by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and Western donors to implement a neo-liberal re-
form package in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The aim
of the SAPs has been to reduce the government's role in the economy, to estab-
lish free markets and a secure environment for private capital, and to enhance Af-
rica's competitiveness in the global economie order. Their central demands
include drastic cuts in public expenditure such as the elimination of subsidies, the
dismantling of price controls, rationalisation in the public sector through
privatisation, lay-offs, wage-cuts and closures, liberalisation of the economy
guided by market forces domestically and comparative advantage internationally,
promotion of commodity exports and foreign Investment, and currency devalua-
tion. In terms of macroeconomic performance, structural adjustment has pro-
duced widely diverging results in Africa but the social consequences have been
more uniformly negative. It is now generally recognised that wage-workers have
been among the most seriously affected by the economie crisis and structural ad-
justment. They are being confronted with retrenchments and job insecurity, wage
restraints and the suspension of benefits, soaring consumer prices and
user-charges for public services, flexible management practices and subcontract-
ing, and an intensification of managerial efforts to increase labour productivity.
World Bank Reports have often attempted to justify these anti-labour measures,
both in economie and political terms (Bangura and Beekman 1993; Adesina
1994; Gibbon 1995; World Bank 1995). The economie justification for structural
adjustment is that workers are "too many and too costly". This is attributed to
misconceived policies, including the development of an overprotected and over-
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unions, their relationship with political parties and other civil-society organisa-
tions, and their search for innovative ways to respond to neo-liberal economie
and political reforms and champion the cause of the workers (see Konings
2000:169-70; Beekman 2002:93-4). The Ghana case deserves most attention
since there have been significant changes in state-trade-union relations during
political liberalisation. The Cameroonian case instead has been characterised by a
remarkable degree of continuity in these relations as aptly observed by
Nyamnjoh (1996:20): "Today Cameroonians have multipartyism but the
one-party logic persists."
Ghana has earned the reputation among Western donors as being one of the few
relative success stories in Africa concerning both economie and political
liberalisation. Several authors (Rothchild 1991; Nugent 1995; Hutchful 2002)
have highlighted the spectacular adoption in 1983 of a neo-liberal economie re-
form package by a radical populist military regime, the Provisional National De-
fence Council (PNDC), albeit without abandoning its populist rhetoric altogether.
Following the rigorous execution of its SAP, there was a relatively peaceful tran-
sition from the military PNDC regime to the civilian National Democratie Con-
gress government in 1992, with Flight-Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings being promoted
from PNDC chairperson to president of Ghana's Fourth Republic. Not only has
the Fourth Republic outlasted earlier democratie interludes, it has also spawned a
fragile institutionalisation of some of the rules and procedures of the democratie
game, manifest, among other things, in a large degree of autonomy for the press
and judiciary, and the resurgence of civil society (Sandbrook and Oelbaum
1997). Ghana, moreover, is said to have a relatively strong labour movement that,
after having been subordinated to the state during the Convention People's Party
(CPP) era, has been able to sustain a tenuous defence of labour rights and union
autonomy in spite of repeated military interventions and impositions (Damachi
1974; Konings 1977; Jeffries 1978; Crisp 1984; Akwetey 1994; Panford 2001).
Although Ghanaian trade-union leaders tended to be strong advocates of neo-lib-
eral political reforms, they were nevertheless opposed to any alliances with Oppo-
sition movements and parties. They regarded trade-union autonomy as an
essential prerequisite for the defence of workers' interests and the pursuit of cre-
ative responses to economie and political liberalisation.
In sharp contrast to Ghana, Cameroon has gained the reputation of being a disap-
pointing 'adjuster' after the Biya government reluctantly agreed to implement an
SAP in 1988/89. Several authors (Van de Walle 1993; Konings 1996; Gabriel
1999) have argued that the neo-patrimonial nature of the Cameroonian
post-colonial state forms a clear obstacle to neo-liberal economie and political
reforms that threaten the ruling elite's control over state resources and rent-seek-
ing activities. As a result, the process of economie and political liberalisation has
been slow and erratic in Cameroon. The Cameroonian trade-union movement,
too, has less standing and influence than its Ghanaian counterpart, having been
subdued and deactivated by the one-party state following independence and re-
unification in 1961, and with its leadership co-opted into the "hegemonie alliance"
(Bayart 1979). This proved to be the main reason for its blatant failure to defeni
workers' interests during economie liberalisation and to support the movemen
for political liberalisation. Autonomous trade unions have emerged during politi
cal liberalisation that are characterised by a high degree of militancy, thus posin
a serious challenge to continuing state intervention in the unions.
This study is based on the author's long-standing research on organised labour i
Ghana and Cameroon (see Konings 1977, 1986, 1993, 1998). Since 1975 I hav
regularly carried out intensive fieldwork in both countries, and I have remained
keen observer of any developments in state-trade-union relationships.
The Ghanaian Trade-Union Movement and Structural Adjust
ment underthe PNDC (1981-1992)
When the PNDC seized power on December 31, 1981, the labour movement wa
in a state of disarray. The leadership of the Ghana Trades Union Congres
(GTUC) was severely compromised in the eyes of many of its members who ac
cused it of bureaucracy, opportunism, the betrayal of workers' interests, am
self-perpetuation in office. In recognition of a series of measures favourable ti
the labour movement, the GTUC leadership had refused to support the protes
actions of other civil-society organisations against the corrupt and oppressiv
Supreme Military Council regime (1972-9), which was eventually overthrowi
by Rawlings during his first coup in June 1979. Neither had it offered any effec
tive leadership in the labour disputes that destroyed the subsequent Third Repub
lic (1979-81) (Kraus 1979; Chazan 1983). Shortly after the 1981 coup, a grou]
of militant trade unionists in the Accra-Tema area that were organised in th<
so-called Association of Local Unions (ALU) launched a putsch of their own
taking over power from the compromised GTUC leadership.
The new leadership expressed its objectives in terms of building a dynamic, revo
lutionary and democratie trade-union movement (Adu-Amankwah 1990; Yeebi
1991). From the very start, the PNDC had supported the change of leadershi]
which, it thought, would bring the trade-union movement more in line with tb
regime's populist orientations. The new leaders were indeed more committed ti
the 'revolution' than their predecessors. Nevertheless, they continued to asser
the independence of the labour movement and its right to represent the interest
of workers. This latter claim became an immediate source of friction between tb
revamped trade-union movement and the PNDC, since new, and apparently com
petitive, labour organisations had been created in the early days of the 'revolu
tion', the so-called Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs) (Konings 1986; Ra;
1986; Hansen and Ninsin 1989).
The Installation of WDCs in the work place undoubtedly posed the greatest chal
lenge in Ghanaian labour history to the existing power relations within enter
prises. The WDCs had wide-ranging responsibilities including the propagatioi
and defence of the revolution, the exposure of management malpractices and cor
ruption, the distribution of essential commodities, supervision of promotions, de-
motions, transfers and dismissals, and - even though this was barely visible
during the most radical phase of the populist regime - disciplining workers and
raising productivity. Above all, the WDCs were supposed to secure an active role
for workers in the decision-making process. Understandably, in the absence of
any clear guidelines for relations between the newly formed WDCs and the trade
unions, there were numerous power struggles between the two organisations.
Most union leaders were inclined to perceive the WDCs as instruments of the
PNDC's hidden agenda to either replace or control the unions. Given this Situa-
tion, the GTUC leadership took the unprecedented step of calling on the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO) to help resolve the issue of who legitimately
represented the workers (Gyimah-Boadi and Essuman-Johnson 1993:202). Al-
though the ILO proved incapable of resolving the dispute, the conflict between
the two labour organisations was eventually more or less settled when the WDCs
were abolished in late 1984 and replaced by Committees for the Defence of the
Revolution (CDRs). Placed under the strict control of the regime, one of the main
roles of the CDRs was to check any resistance by the labour movement to struc-
tural adjustment. As a result, they rapidly lost the confidence of the rank and file
(Ninsin 1989:35-7).
Hutchful (1989) convincingly showed that the World Bank continuously insisted
on the abolition of the WDCs as a major condition for the allocation of funds:
"the concentrated fire of the World Bank was reserved for the WDCs and their al-
leged 'propensity to engage in disruptive tactics,'" in particular "the harassment
of private enterprise". Clamping down on these 'revolutionary' organs was there-
fore viewed by the PNDC as a necessary prerequisite to reassure the Bretton
Woods institutions of a peaceful environment - both industrially and politically -
for the optimum utilisation of their global fmancial resources. The PNDC had an
additional interest in their abolition, having often accused the national co-ordina-
tion of the Defence Committees of revolutionary overzealousness and of estab-
lishing a parallel government (Konings 1986; Yeebo 1991). The curbing of the
WDCs' power, however, had the probably unintended consequence of reunifying
the labour movement in its struggle against structural adjustment.
A wider gulf between the PNDC and organised labour developed after the pre-
sentation of the first SAP-inspired budget in April 1983. lts announcement of se-
vere curtailments in public subsidies and price rises came as a shock to the
workers, who had been the main supporters of Rawlings's 'revolution'. Strik-
ingly, although the ALU leaders of the GTUC had not been consulted in advance
and deeply resented the perceived failure of the regime to shift the bürden of ad-
justment from the shoulders of the poor to those of the rieh, they refused to mobi-
lise angry workers against the anti-labour budget. Being still strongly committed
to the revolution, they appealed to the workers to exercise utmost restraint so as
not to jeopardise the long-term goals of the workers' struggles (Herbst
1991:186). Nevertheless, they expressed reservations about the budget as a whole
and called for the suspension of some points, in particular increases in the price
of petrol and the severe limits set on wage increases through collective bargaii
ing. Their criticism provoked a violent WDC attack on the GTUC headquarters
no doubt with PNDC support.
An important event for future relations between state and organised labour toe
place at the end of the same year. After being postponed several times, the GTU
delegates' conference was fmally held. The ALU leadership was voted out of o
fice, being generally seen as too subservient to the Rawlings regime (Yeeb
1991), and was replaced by the old guard. The newly elected secretary-genera
A.K. Yankey, had served on the ousted GTUC board as the general secretary <
the General Transport, Petroleum and Chemical Workers' Union. Thes
old-guard leaders were not concerned with safeguarding the ideals of the revoli
tion since they had been among its principal casualties in 1982. They were moi
worried about preserving trade-union autonomy versus the state and upholdir
what they considered was the essential task of the unions, namely the defence (
workers' interests, even if it meant jeopardising the good relationship that hc
been established.
Rawlings addressed the assembled delegates at the congress in a speech that w;
to herald future conflicts. He warned that the GTUC was viewed by the people ;
an Organisation that had "attempted to hold the rest of the community to ranso.
in order to extract benefits for its members". This, hè asserted, was untenable
the "revolutionary Situation, in which we are all working for the common good
Yankey, in reply, said hè hoped that the labour movement would be consulted c
all future economie measures, and ended by maintaining that the GTUC was rul
behind PNDC efforts to rebuild the country. This was immediately belied
PNDC eyes when the GTUC called for a minimum wage of 300 cedis a day at
time when the lowest paid workers could expect only 21 to 25 cedis. Rawlinj
greeted the demand with derision and anger. It was "absolute rubbish - the ou
come of ignorant minds. Are such people enemies?" (Adu-Amankw£
1990:100). The distance between the PNDC and the GTUC remained as to what
reasonable wage was.
The new GTUC leadership started attacking the various SAP measures for the
nefarious effects on workers' living and working conditions, leading to the deve
opment of increasingly antagonistic relations between the unions and the regim
For example, a resolution adopted by the GTUC executive board in 1984 noted
As a result of these IMF and World Bank conditions, the working people
of Ghana now face unbearable conditions of life expressed in poor nutri-
tion, high prices of goods and services, inadequate housing, continuing
deterioration of social services and growing unemployment above all we
caution government that the above conditions pose serious implications
for the sharpening of class conflict in the society. (Herbst 1991:184)
The GTUC repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the SAP "as being impos<
by the Bretton Woods institutions", the restoration of collective bargaining pr
cedures, and union participation in the economie decision-making process
(Adu-Amankwah 1990). Ho wever, while they continued to agitate against the re-
forms, the new leaders clearly recognised that, given the autocratie nature of the
PNDC, there were limits to the regime's patience when it came to confronting ac-
tual protests. The new secretary-general, A.K. Yankey, therefore sought to oper-
ate cautiously, doubting the ability of the GTUC to survive a war of attrition.
Consequently, hè usually tried to make known the GTUC position by presenting
memoranda to the government and press Communications to the general public.
This form of trade-union protest appeared to have little impact on the govern-
ment, which mostly ignored union demands. Only on rare occasions did the re-
gime feel compelled to make concessions (Adu-Amankwah and Tutu 1997).
The GTUC's greatest victory during this period was in 1986 when the govern-
ment unilaterally cancelled leave allowances for public-sector workers. The
GTUC leadership told the government that lack of communication herween the
regime and the unions left it with no choice but to call a general strike. It exhorted
workers to wave red flags and wear red armbands and headbands (the customary
sign of mourning). The outrage expressed by ordinary workers, who perceived
the allowances as a welcome addition to their meagre incomes, suggested that the
strike enjoyed the overwhelming support of its members. The PNDC realised that
it had gone too far and swiftly reinstated the allowances and soon also reactivated
the existing tripartite instirutions and created new bilateral forms of consultation.
Subsequent government attempts to convene these forums on an ad hoc basis and
to use them as instruments for compromising the unions (by having them accept
already predetermined wage levels) created new sources of conflict between the
PNDC and the GTUC. Workers, too, regularly expressed their dissatisfaction
with the outcome of the tripartite negotiations. For example, at the May Day rally
in 1991 they protested against low wages and waved banners, some of which ac-
cused their leaders of collaborating with the PNDC (Akwetey 2001:92).
The PNDC effectively deployed a variety of strategies to contain trade-union Op-
position. First, the government and its leading spokesmen, using the state-con-
trolled media, continued to accuse the trade-union movement of being selfish, of
making unrealistic demands, misleading the workers, and being engaged in sub-
versive activities aimed at destabilising and derailing the revolution
(Adu-Amankwah 1990; Gyimah-Boadi and Essuman-Johnson 1993). Second, the
PNDC continued to use divide-and-rule tactics against organised labour, capital-
ising on the fact that the SAP had a differential impact on the various sectors of
the economy. Thus, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union, which generally
endorsed the liberalisation measures (increased fares, imports of vehicles and
spare parts), and the Railway Workers' Union, which had benefited from the re-
habilitation of the railways, were easily pitted against the Industrial and Commer-
cial Workers' Union (ICU) whose members were threatened with privatisation
and job losses (Nugent 1995). Third, while radical trade-union leaders were be-
ing hounded by the security agencies, the PNDC was careful to nurture its rela-
tionship with those it perceived as moderates. An excellent example is the
intimidating tactics used by the PNDC during the elections at the 1988 <
Congress in Cape Coast. These elections took place under the watchful e
numerous state security agents. In his opening address, Captain (retired}
Tsikata, the PNDC member in charge of national security who played a 1<
role in the Containment of labour during the PNDC era (Adu-Amankwah
Nugent 1995), cautioned the delegates as follows against electing a militan
ership:
The trade union movement is like a ship sailing slowly but surely to its
destination. If we permit these infantile leftists, these super-revolutionar-
ies, these people who want to be more Catholic than the Pope to seize
control of this ship, [which] I say is moving slowly but surely, well for
those who can swim, 'good luck', but for those of you who cannot swim,
you better say your last prayers. (Adu-Amankwah 1990:103^)
Due to these intimidatory tactics, the majority of the delegates refused to eL
radical general secretary of the ICU and acting secretary-general of the C
L.G. Ocloo, as the secretary-general of the GTUC. Ocloo was later even foi
go into exile because of his outspoken and independent stand on trade-unio
ters. Yankey, who was then re-elected with the support of the PNDC, b
more or less co-opted into the regime. He was subsequently appointed a m
of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), an agency created l
PNDC to oversee the formulation of new political and constitutional ar
ments for the country. Following this appointment, hè regularly assun
PNDC of GTUC support for its economie policies (Adu-Amankwah 1990
He was subsequently offered an ambassadorial post.
It is also beyond any doubt that some trade-union members remained susce
to the regime's continued use of populist rhetoric. Rawlings, with his ap
honesty and modest behaviour, seems not to have lost his charismatic apf
the champion of the common man (Hutchful 2002:175).
In the last instance, the PNDC did not hesitate to employ strong-arm tact
cluding coercion and repression. While the PNDC left workers some latit
remoulding power relations in the workplace between 1982 and 1984, l
mid-1980s there was a good chance that the coercive apparatus of the sta'
being actively deployed on the side of management and employers in the e\
a dispute. For example, when Cocobod wanted to lay off over 20 000 worl
November 1985, the PNDC passed a special law (PNDC Law 125) that er
ered the management to ignore the labour law regarding retrenchments
testing union leaders were summoned to the Bureau of National Investig
(the state security agency), were held for a couple of hours and then release
a warning to behave "if they did not want to spend Christmas in detention''
sequently, the government was to deploy security forces at the GTUC heai
ters to prevent its leadership from holding a mass meeting to protest agaii
method of retrenchment. It was a mark of the regime's ruthlessness in d
with worker and union pretests that relatively few strikes were recorded between
1983 and 1991, even though labour discontent was running high (Gyimah-Boadi
and Essuman-Johnson 1993:206).
The Ghanaian Trade-Union Movement and Structural Adjust-
ment under the NDC (1992-2000)
The global trend towards political liberalisation from the end of the 1980s, the
new Standards of Western governments and international financial institutions for
capital allocation that linked Structural adjustment to liberal democracy, and the
growing Opposition of urban civil-society organisations in Ghana to military rule
all contributed to the PNDC announcement in 1991 that the country would return
to a multiparty system (Nugent 1995; Drah and Oquaye 1996; Ninsin 1998;
Hutchful 2002).
The GTUC has been an active advocate of neo-liberal reforms for a number of
reasons, the most important being the creation of a political system in which it
could operate without fear of repressive military tactics and could participate in
the economie decision-making process. For example, the GTUC secretary-gen-
eral, A.K. Yankey, made the following observation at the 1991 Labour Day rally:
"Experience in Africa shows that SAPs fail if they are not based on a high degree
of national consensus which depends on free and independent trade unions oper-
ating within a strengthened tripartite arrangement for the discussion of key policy
issues" (Panford 2001:94). At its Third Quadrennial Delegates Conference at
Cape Coast in March 1988, the GTUC called for the convening of a democratie
National Constituent Assembly to formulate a constitution that could be submit-
ted to the people for approval, and introducé a large measure of political
liberalisation. It also took the lead in opposing the 1988 'no-party' District As-
sembly elections (Ayee 1994), urging a boycott. Although its pro-democracy and
pro-human-rights position coincided with that of the Movement for Freedom and
Justice (an Opposition umbrella Organisation created in 1990), the GTUC refused
to join this Organisation and support its struggle for the introduction of
multipartyism in Ghana. And, even more significantly, around the time that the
campaign for multiparty elections began in the autumn of 1992, the GTUC con-
stitution was amended to prohibit the Organisation from entering into alliance
with any political party for the purpose of winning elections. This amendment ap-
pears to have been motivated partly by the bitter lessons learnt by the GTUC in
prior alliances with political parties such as the CPP, 1958-66 and the Social
Democratie Front (SDF), 1979-81. A second reason was a lack of confidence in
the alternative constituted by the Opposition coalition to Rawlings. The labour
movement also mistrusted a number of Opposition leaders who, as members of
the Progress Party government (1969-72), had dissolved the GTUC in 1971 for
its allegedly 'unofficial Opposition'. As a result, the GTUC concluded that it
would be in a better position to defend workers' interests if it preserved its au-
tonomy towards the political parties. lts conclusion seems to be justified by the
generally negative experiences of trade-union alliances in other African
tries. The Zambian experience highlights the fact that union alliances with j
cal parties to facilitate political transition cannot necessarily guarantee th,
labour movement will become more influential in government circles. The
ence of the Zambian trade unions declined when its ally, the Movement for
tiparty Democracy, committed itself to an ambitieus economie überaus
Programme after electoral victory (Akwetey 2001; Rakner 2001). Union alli
with political parties also appear problematic in other African countries su
South Africa and Zimbabwe (Webster and Adler 2001; Sachikonye 2001).
During the transition period Rawlings formed his own party, the National D
cratic Congress (NDC), which pledged to continue PNDC policies. Severc
thors (see Nugent 1995; Hutchful 2002) have already explained why Raw
and the NDC were able to win both the 1992 and 1996 presidential and p;
mentary elections. What is of greater relevance here is that it swiftly bei
clear that the NDC government would find it harder than the PNDC to imple
the harsh SAP measures. Rawlings, who had never bothered to hide his di
for neo-liberal political reforms, immediately blanied democracy for unde
ting the adjustment process. To a certain extent, hè was right. Poli
liberalisation and mobilisation by the pro-democracy forces now encourag
more open, articulate and better-organised resistance to adjustment policies
rendered repression less feasible as an avenue to policy reform. Howeve
Hutchful (2002:220-23) aptly observes, internal processes of regime transfo
tion in response to the challenge of competitive politics provide a second kt
understanding the apparent lack of government resolve to execute the harsh
measures, which drew scorn from international donors. The regime's increa
concern with winning elections was bringing about a shift in power from tec
crats to political brokers who were more interested in patronage than in mi
rationality. Corruption by the ruling political elite became increasingly bla
eroding the ascetic image that had served the regime so well during the ea
years of structural adjustment and robbing it of the moral stature and abilit
demand sacrifices.
One of the effects of political liberalisation on industrial relations was rene
labour militancy. The civil and public services in particular were regularly p
lysed by severe and protracted strike actions - a manifestation of the work
relative freedom to voice their long-standing grievances about low real incor
increasing retrenchments and job insecunty, persistent government effort1
postpone or reduce end-of-service benefits that prevented retrenched wori
from setting up in the informal sector, and flexible management practices.
several occasions, workers invaded the office of the minister of finance and t
nomic planning, Dr Kwesi Botchwey, who had occupied this post since 1982
was generally perceived as one of the main architects of structural adjustmen
Ghana, and threatened to hurt him.
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The mounting social discontent exploded in 1995. Finally, on March l, the
NDC-dominated parliament approved a new value-added tax (VAT) of 17.5 per
cent as part of the Bretton Woods institutions' strategy of enhancing public reve-
nues. A few months later, on May 11, a group of Opposition leaders calling itself
the Alliance for Change organised a massive demonstration by workers, youth,
the unemployed and members of the general public to protest against the imposi-
tion of the new tax. The anti-V AT protests, which were supported by the GTUC,
were initially restricted to Accra but spread later to other regional capitals as
well. The demonstrators chanted in Akan 'Kume preko' (You might as well kill
me now) to express their willingness to die rather than live under structural ad-
justment. In many respects, these demonstrations resembled the previous
anti-SAP uprisings in Zambia (from 1985 to 1987) and in Nigeria (in 1986 and
1988-9) where revolts by the urban masses protesting against the withdrawal of
subsidies and concomitant price hikes forced their governments to withdraw
SAPs temporarily (Simutanyi 1996; Bangura and Beekman 1993). Although the
anti-VAT demonstrations in Ghana were of a peaceful nature, participants were
nevertheless attacked by members of the pro-government Association of Com-
mittees for the Defence of the Revolution, resulting in the death of four demon-
strators and numerous injuries, some critical. Confronted with such a dangerous
Situation, President Rawlings recalled parliament from recess and, under a certifï-
cate of urgency, it reduced the rate of VAT to 15.5 per cent, before dropping it
completely on June 11. The government also announced fmancial compensation
for the deaths and injuries caused during the demonstrations.
Developments preceding the 2000 elections were reminiscent of events associ-
ated with the VAT debacle. After a lull, growing signs of public dissatisfaction
with the effects of the SAP emerged that resulted in serious strikes, demonstra-
tions and boycotts. There were various reasons for this renewed expression of
mass discontent: there was the serious deterioration in the general economie Situ-
ation as a result of the record fall of cocoa and gold prices on the world market
coupled with a steep rise in the import of oil; the widening gap between the mass
suffering of so many and the lavish lifestyles of NDC politicians and apparat-
chiks; and in addition the implementation of the Price Waterhouse Report. After
expectation for several years that the report would finally resolve the thorny issue
of wages and salary structures in the public service, it instead generaled one of
the stormiest labour responses in the country, almost leading to a nationwide
strike (Panford 2001).
Political liberalisation also had important effects on the labour movement. Just
before handing over power to the NDC, the PNDC allowed public servants, pre-
viously barred from direct collective bargaining, to bargain with the government
over wages and conditions of service. The 1992 constitution for the first time re-
cognised the right of workers to join any local, national or international union of
their choice and to demonstrate against public policies without having to go
through the cumbersome procedure of acquiring a police permit beforehand
(Panford 2001). These constitutional provisions permitted workers to form and
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join trade unions and trade-union federations that were not affiliated t<
GTUC. With the registration in 1992 of the Textile, Garment and Leather
ployees' Union (TGLEU), a breakaway ICU union, the first non-GTUC i
was born in Ghana. In April 1999, the TGLEU and a few other relatively s
unions and public servants' associations founded a new trade-union feden
the Ghana Federation of Labour (GFL), to "inject new blood and compei
into union Organisation to meet the challenges of the SAP" (GFL 1999). The
is still in its infancy and has not yet been able to challenge the dominant poï
of the much older and larger GTUC in the field of industrial relations.
Having achieved a larger measure of autonomy during political liberalisatior
GTUC began to reassert its right to promote the interests of the workers thr
the pursuit of collective bargaining, participation in the national decision-m£
process, and other ways of representing the workers such as representatie:
parliament on issues that were considered of vital importance. lts newly els
leadership proved less reluctant to deploy the general-strike weapon to bac
demands for higher wages and to denounce the NDC government's repeate
tempts to violate collective agreements as well as decisions arrived at in the l
eral and tripartite forums. For instance, in January 1995 the GTUC threater
general strike on these issues. Subsequently, the government allowed the tr
tite forum to negotiate a new national minimum wage, and promised to in
ment the decisions of the tripartite meetings (Adu-Amankwah and
1997:265-6). The GTUC also began to explore other ways of forcing the go\
ment to respect collective-bargaining procedures. It has increasingly relied 01
courts in Ghana, and has filed two complaints with the ILO to prevent the
ernment from rejecting conditions of work and lay-off benefits establi
through collective bargaining.
Interestingly, the GTUC began to assume a series of new initiatives to mee
challenges posed by economie and political liberalisation. At its Fifth Quac
nial Congress at the University of Cape Coast in August 1996, it adopted a r
ber of policies that it has been implementing ever since (GTUC 1996).
The first was to strengthen the Organisation. The GTUC has been confronted
a declining membership since the implementation of SAP. Estimated merr
ship has dropped from a peak of 708 000 in 1990 to 521 000 in 1996. One i
sure proposed to increase membership was the Organisation of senior
members in the industrial and commercial sectors, a measure that met with fi
resistance from the Ghana Employers' Association and individual employer
in the case of the Standard Chartered Bank of Ghana. In this instance, the Gr
filed a court writ to compei the chief labour officer to issue a collective barj
ing certificate to the senior staff involved. A second measure proposed t<
crease membership was an intensification of the unions' efforts to orgE
workers in the rapidly expanding informal sector. Since the 1970s, a few nati
unions had already starled organising in the informal sector (Konings l
Yanney 2000; Panford 2001). This was to be given a further boost by more
scious planning so that appropriate organisational forms would be developed for
bringing informal-sector workers and associations into the framework of the un-
ion Organisation. A few recent initiatives include the following. The Public Ser-
vice Workers' Union has organised small-scale photographers into the Ghana
Union of Professional Photographers, and the ICU assisted hairdressers and bar-
bers to form the Ghana Hairdressers and Beauticians' Association. A third mea-
sure proposed to increase membership was to pay more attention to the
Organisation of women, who are more likely to lose their jobs during SAPs.
Women will also be given more leadership positions within unions.
The second policy initiative taken at the Fifth Quadrennial Congress was the es-
tablishment of worker-owned enterprises. This initiative - not a completely new
phenomenon in Ghanaian labour history - was an attempt to contribute to em-
ployment generation, to expand the base for union membership, and to improve
and broaden the main sources of union fmances. Following a close study of the
Histadrut model in Israël, the GTUC had launched a number of worker-owned
enterprises during the CPP era (Konings 1977:112-3; Damachi 1974:35, 60). In
addition, within the framework of the military National Redemption Council's
policies in the 1970s to 'indigenise' the commanding heights of the economy, the
GTUC encouraged unions and workers to obtain shares in foreign and for-
eign-state enterprises (Konings 1977:151-53). It was thought that this would
"create a greater sense of belonging and promote a higher sense of responsibility
among workers" (Ninsin 1989:27). In 1996, the GTUC resolved to set up a La-
bour Enterprises Trust (LET) with a minimum share capital of 25 billion cedis.
This was based on the assumption that an estimated 500 000 workers would con-
tribute 50 000 cedis over a 20-month period. However, at the end of the subscrip-
tion period it emerged that no more than 86 000 workers had contributed to LET,
amounting to 5.5 billion cedis (only 22 per cent of the expected share capital)
(LET Company 2000). The LET board then started investing in projects such as
the Accra City Car Project, an insurance project, as well as water-tanker and ra-
dio-taxi services. Excluding the Accra City Car Project, the projects created 90
jobs. Future projects will include the establishment of a commercial bank, secu-
rity services, fuel service stations, waste management, estate management, and a
supermarket (Yanney 2000). A historie moment in Ghanaian labour history oc-
curred in January 1999 when the local branch of the Ghana Mine Workers' Un-
ion took over Prestea Goldfields from Barnex, a South African gold-mining
Company, by investing its members' one-million-dollar severance award in con-
tinued mining operations. Workers and management resolved to run the first
worker-owned mining Company in Ghana, which was renamed Prestea Gold Re-
sources Ltd, as effectively as possible. The 1473 miners took this radical measure
to save their jobs and to forestall economie decline and social decay in the
Prestea area (Yanney 2000; Panford 2001). It is still too early to assess the pros-
pects for labour-owned enterprises in Ghana. Compared to South Africa (Iheduru
2001), 'labour capitalism' in Ghana is still at an early stage.
A third policy initiative taken at the Fifth Quadrennial Congress was th(
provement of workers' representation and participation. While the GTUC
continued to oppose SAPs, its Opposition was weakened by the lack of a clea
credible policy alternative. This can be attributed mainly to the fact that i
search capabilities at present are too limited to intervene meaningfully in the
icy debate (Hutchful 2002:173) and this is the reason why the GTUC nee
expand its research activities and collaborate more closely with the country
search institutes. Besides its determination to improve workers' participati
the national decision-making process and collective bargaining, the GTU(
also decided to initiale a research programme on industrial democracy and
cate the rank and file on workers' participation in enterprises. This driv
greater participation by workers is a clear indication that the trade unions ar
only prepared to contribute to the development of a democratie culture in so
but also to come to grips with forms of collective action that are supplement
traditional collective bargaining with its often confrontational nature (see IV
and Schiphorst 1995). Realising that many enterprises will need to restructi
they are to survive and meet global competition, the unions appear to be ac
ing responsibility for improving their efficiency and productivity in exchang
a greater say in decision-making.
A final policy initiative taken at the Fifth Quadrennial Congress was the intei
cation of relations with other civil-society organisations. Back in 1986
GTUC had already mobilised the support of Ghana's most important
lic-service associations - the Ghana National Association of Teachers
Ghana Registered Nurses' Association (GRNA) and the Ghana Civil Serv
Association - resulting in the formation of a common platform in defen«
workers' interests, the so-called Ghana Consultative Labour Forum, but thi
came virtually dormant during the 1990s. In 1999, the GRNA and a n
formed public-service association, the Judicial Services Staff Association, c
to join the new labour federation, the Ghana Federation of Labour (GFL)
sides the labour organisations, links to other civil-society organisations su<
the Ghana Bar Association and the media were strengthened as well. In 199'
GTUC requested that the government set up a national forum, made up of th
partite partners and important civil-society associations, on the state of the
naian economy. This idea materialised in May 1996 when, under the auspic
the Tripartite Committee, labour, business and other civil-society groups sui
the Bar and Journalist Associations met the government and political parti
discuss the economy (Akwetey 2001).
Ghana has often been presented as a model country for neo-liberal economie
political reforms in Africa. By strengthening its Organisation, allying it to i
civil-society organisations and adopting a number of new initiatives in resp
to globalisation, the GTUC, too, appears to be a trendsetter in state-union
tions in West and Central Africa.
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Trade Unionism and Economie and Political Liberalisation in
Cameroon
Cameroon used to be one of the most prosperous and stable countries in
West-Central Africa but since the mid-1980s onwards it has been facing an un-
precedented economie and political crisis (Konings 1996). After some initial hes-
itation, the Biya government could no longer escape frorn calling upon the
Bretton Woods institutions due to the deteriorating economie Situation. In
1988/89, it was forced to implement an SAP. Given the fusion between the
post-colonial state and civil society, it is not altogether surprising that the Cam-
eroonian trade-union movement put up hardly any protest against the austere
SAP measures.
Trade unionism in both Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon was character-
ised by a high degree of militancy during colonial rule. Unlike their Francophone
counterparts, Anglophone trade-union leaders appeared to disapprove of close
alliances with the nationalist movement and parties, largely accepting the Brit-
ish-imposed model of autonomous and economistic trade unionism (Joseph
1977; Bayart 1979; Konings 1993). However, following independence and reuni-
fication in 1961, the Ahidjo regime (1961-82) gradually succeeded in merging
all the existing trade union centres into a single body, the National Union of
Cameroon Workers (NUCW), and subordinating it to the state for the sake of na-
tional reconstruction. As shown elsewhere (Konings 1993, 1998), Ahidjo's at-
tempts to transform trade unionism from a vehicle of labour resistance into an
instrument of labour control were never fully successful. Although the NUCW
leadership was effectively co-opted into the hegemonie alliance (Bayart 1979), it
often failed to impose 'social peace' on regional and lócal trade unions.
The close relationship between the state and trade unions continued under
Ahidjo's successor, Paul Biya. At the 1985 Bamenda Congress, Biya changed the
name of the single party from the Cameroon National Union to the Cameroon
People's Democratie Movement (CPDM), and commended the central labour Or-
ganisation on the constructive role it had played in society. The NUCW, in turn,
immediately changed its name to the Cameroon Trade Union Congress (CTUC),
and its then president, J.E. Abondo, "thanked President Paul Biya a thousand
times for all that hè had done for the workers" (Fondation Friedrich-Ebert 1994).
Soon afterwards, Mr Abondo was appointed minister of defence, a clear reward
for his services to the regime.
Although the corrupt and authoritarian Biya regime swiftly lost its legitimacy
during the severe economie and political crisis, the CTUC continued to support
the regime. Like the ruling CPDM party, it strongly condemned the increasing
calls in civil society for political liberalisation and the introduction of a multi-
party system. When the first Opposition party, the SDF, was formed in the
Anglophone part of the country in 1990, the then CTUC president, D. Fouda
Sima, expressed, as did other CPDM loyalists, "his total rejection of what the
head of state has called political models imported from abroad" (Konings
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2000:179). Together with other CTUC leaders, he subsequently participated in
anti-democracy marches organised by the regime.
After the Biya government, under considerable pressure from the Bretton Woods
institutions and Western donors, notably France, had been compelled to intro-
ducé a multiparty system and increased freedom of speech and association in De-
cember of that same year (Konings 1996), a growing dissatisfaction could be
seen among the rank and file with the CTUC's performance and its continuing al-
liance with the ruling CPDM party. This was manifest in a series of strikes, par-
ticularly in the parastatal sector, against retrenchment and other SAP measures,
and in the workers' support of the Opposition. Many workers participated in the
protracted 1991 'ghost town' campaign - essentially a civil disobedience action
aimed at bringing the economy to a complete standstill and called by the radical
Opposition to force the Biya regime to hold a sovereign national conference
(Takougang and Krieger 1998:126-31).
Even within the CTUC regional and local leadership, severe criticism of its posi-
tion and calls for union autonomy versus the state and political parties could be
heard (see Mehler 1997). The president of the CTUC in the Fako division of
Anglophone Cameroon, C.P.N. Vewessee, who in the meantime had joined the
Opposition, was to become the most vocal opponent of the corrupt national lead-
ership of the CTUC, openly condemning it for its continued alliance with the rul-
ing party and its complete neglect of the defence of workers' interests during the
economie crisis and the SAP. Moreover, hè advocated the unions' direct involve-
ment in the struggle for the establishment of a truly democratie system in the
country. In February 1991 hè declared:
The workers expect an independent and strong trade union Organisation
that would be autonomous in relation to all political parties and state bod-
ies and institutions. This will relieve the trade unions of the rubber-stamp
element in the country's political life. If the trade union does not become
more militant and resolute in its demands, then the CTUC won't be of
much help to the workers. (Konings 1995:531)
Under mounting pressure, the CTUC fmally recognised the right of its members
to join the political party of their choice on April 2, 1991. The new Labour Code
of 1992 guaranteed trade-union autonomy towards the state, and the CTUC sub-
sequently changed its name to the Confederation of Cameroon Trade Unions
(CCTU) to reflect its newly acquired autonomous status. However, this did not
mean the end of government Intervention in the unions. The government devel-
oped several strategies to keep the unions under its control. The 1992 CCTU
elections were clearly manipulated by the government buying the support of a
number of delegates to make sure that Etame Ndedi, the trade-union representa-
tive in the CPDM central committee, instead of Mr Vewessee, the populär and
outspoken Anglophone trade-union leader, would be elected president of the cen-
tral labour Organisation. While the government succeeded in this endeavour, it
could not forestall the election of a number of autonomous trade-union leaders.
One of them, Louis Sombès, became secretary-general.
Government intervention in the union became even more overt in late 1993 when
Mr Sombès was sacked by the union president, Etame Ndedi, for having called a
general strike of civil servants in protest at severe cuts in their remuneration.
Both the regime and the union president tried to prevent a meeting of the union
executive, the majority of whom advocated Sombès' reinstatement. Not even
protests from the ILO could dissuade the government from further intervening in
the matter. It openly supported the Installation of Jules Mousseni, a CPDM loyal-
ist and second vice-secretary-general of the CCTU, who had been unilaterally
nominated by Etame Ndedi as the new secretary-general of the union. This led
the ILO to rebuff Etame Ndedi and the government at its June 1994 Annual Con-
vention in Geneva by refusing to accredit Mousseni. Given the stalemate
Sombès' dismissal had caused in the union and the Geneva debacle, the fïrst
vice-president of the CCTU convened a meeting of the union executive in July
1994, which decided to reinstate Sombès and sack Etame Ndedi instead. A few
months later, in September 1994, security forces raided the union headquarters in
Yaoundé and forcibly removed Sombès from office, throwing him into prison
(Fondation Friedrich-Ebert 1994:78; Eboussi Boulaga 1997:347-8). Realising
that not even the arrest of Sombès could prevent the CCTU from asserting its au-
tonomy, the regime decided to sponsor a rival trade-union centre, the Union of
Free Trade Unions of Cameroon, which was to serve as an instrument for the
continuing incorporation of trade unionism into the state (Konings 2000).
Unfortunately, it soon became manifest that the CCTU was not going to play a
more significant role in economie and political liberalisation than its new rival.
From 1997 onwards it split into two factions, with both having claimed leader-
ship ever since. Their struggles for power appear to have been motivated not only
by differences over the federation's policies and strategies but also by sheer ma-
terial interests: leadership positions in the federation offered the incumbents mul-
tiple opportunities to divert the substantial union dues to personal ends and to
travel abroad regularly at the invitation of international labour organisations. The
leadership struggle has given rise to numerous court cases, the Organisation of
several 'unity' conferences held under the auspices of the ILO and international
labour organisations, and renewed government interference in the federation. The
minister of labour, Pius Ondoua, has persistently refused to recognise the leader-
ship of the reformist faction backed by the ILO and the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), openly supporting the other faction that
appeared closer to the government and its policies, and to meet and negotiate
with the federation. On September 12, 2001, the secretary-general of the ICFTU,
Bill Jordan, informed President Paul Biya that his Organisation would lodge a
complaint with the ILO about renewed government interference in trade-union
matters (Le Messager October l, 2001). Given the two federations' lack of de-
fence of workers' interests, workers were increasingly inclined to resort to strike
action during political liberalisation. This was particularly the case in the
Francophone area, where trade unionism tended to be centrally organised. In t
Anglophone area, where trade unionism had a stronger base at the local and i
gional level, union leaders usually played a more active role in the defence
workers' interests (Konings 1993). For example, in the Cameroon Developme
Corporation, a huge agro-industrial parastatal in Anglophone Cameroon with
current labour force of approximately 14 000, trade unionism has continued
play a significant mediating role between workers and management. When t
corporation was in need of restructuring during the severe fiscal crisis starting
1986/87, both management and labour called upon the union for assistance. "
the management, the union was a vital Organisation in controlling the anticipat
resistance of the militant labour force to a painful adjustment programme. To t
workers, it offered a defence in a Situation where their bargaining power was e
tremely weak. To save the corporation from total collapse, the union agreed wi
the management in 1990 on austere adjustment measures, including a drastic c
in the salaries and fringe benefits of all the workers and managerial staff mei
bers, an increase in workers' productivity, and the introduction of a compulso
savings scheme, in return for management promises to safeguard workers' jol
As soon as it became clear that the management was not keeping to the terms
the agreement and was laying off a considerable number of workers, the unii
called a strike in May 1992 that brought about several modifications favourah
to the workers (Konings 1995).
The most important development during political liberalisation was the em<
gence of several autonomous trade unions in the civil and public services, esp
cially in the educational sector. Their leaders strongly condemned the inactivi
of the existing labour federations and pledged to contribute to the resurgence
militant trade unionism in Cameroon and to serve as a countervailing power
the ruling regime (Fondation Friedrich-Ebert 1994; Sindjoun 1999). Unsurpr
ingly, they soon became victims of state repression under the pretext that pub
servants were prohibited by law from forming trade unions.
The fïrst autonomous trade union was set up by university lecturers when, <
June l, 1991, the Syndicat National des Enseignants du Supérieur (SYNES) w
founded at the University of Yaoundé after security forces and pro-governme
militia had terrorised student opponents (Konings 2002). The regime did evei
thing to weaken or eliminate SYNES. lts leadership was intimidated and ev
physically attacked. lts president, Jongwa Dipoko, and its secretary-gener
Issidore Noumba, were summoned by the disciplinary board of the university a
suspended from teaching and doing research for a period of two years because
their trade-union activities. After a complaint by SYNES, the ILO insisted
1993 that civil servants in Cameroon be given the right to unionise. The Bi
government simply ignored the ILO demand, arguing that an illegal organisati
like SYNES could not lodge a complaint against the government.
Following the establishment of SYNES, other autonomous unions were form
in the educational sector. The most important in the Francophone area were t
Syndicat National Autonome de l'Enseignement Secondaire and the Syndicat
National de l'Enseignement Primaire et Maternel. The most important in the
Anglophone area were the Teachers' Association of Cameroon and the Camer-
oon Anglophone Teachers Trade Union. In January-February 1994, the autono-
mous trade unions in the educational sector participated in a general strike in the
public service in protest against two drastic cuts in their salaries (amounting to 70
per cent) in 1993, the non-payment of their September-October 1993 salaries,
and the 50 per cent devaluation of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)
franc in January 1994.
Since 1995 the autonomous unions have called numerous strikes, demonstrations
and boycorts in the educational sector. The majority of their demands concern re-
forms in the educational sector, participation in educational decision-making, and
improvement in conditions of service. The government has been particularly re-
luctant to sign new Statutes for teachers and to publish the text of application after
fmally signing these Statutes.
Cameroon has often been presented as a bad adjuster. Cameroonian trade unions
appear to have performed no better, having largely failed to play any significant
role in economie and political liberalisation. The emergence of autonomous trade
unions in the public sector is a sign of hope.
Conclusion
One has to be extremely careful when making pessimistic or optimistic generali-
sations about the role of trade unions in Africa. My West and Central African
case studies provide ample evidence that the widespread pessimism about the
role of African unions in the current economie and political liberalisation pro-
cesses seems to be more relevant to Cameroon than to Ghana, especially during
the NDC era. It has been shown that a number of factors are responsible for the
better performance of trade unions in Ghana than in Cameroon, notably their
stronger organisational capacity, their greater autonomy towards the state and po-
litical parties, and their search for innovative ways to respond to neo-liberal eco-
nomie and political reforms and to defend workers' interests.
Although the Ghanaian trade-union movement was able to maintain a certain
measure of autonomy during the PNDC era, it largely failed to achieve any mean-
ingful say in economie decision-making or to win any substantial concessions for
its members. The military PNDC was one of the few regimes in Africa that suc-
ceeded in rigorously implementing the austere SAP measures, essentially on the
basis of an ascetic, populist style of leadership and severe repression. Strongly
convinced that a constitutional government would provide more space for the de-
fence of workers' interests than a military regime, the GTUC became a strong ad-
vocate of neo-liberal political reforms. It thus provided a mass populär base for
the country's democratie movement that had hitherto been derided by the regime
as the preserve of the elite. Unlike the Zambian trade-union movement, the
GTUC refused to enter into any formal alliance with the Opposition, fearing in
part that such an alliance would harm its representation of workers' interests in a
multiparty system.
During the NDC era, the government found it hard to execute its SAP in an envi-
ronment of political liberalisation and electoral competition, leading to the resur-
gence of worker militancy and the development of increased trade-union
autonomy, The latter enabled the unions to better defend workers' interests and
promote trade-union rights. Even more significantly, the economie and political
reforms have since become a source of inspiration for Ghanaian union leaders in
their pursuit of new and innovative ways to mobilise workers. They have at-
tempted to strengthen the Organisation by recruiting new members from outside
the traditional trade-union constituency, notably senior staff members, infor-
mal-sector workers and women, and have begun to establish worker-owned en-
terprises. They have taken a number of initiatives to improve workers'
participation in the national decision-making process and in enterprises. And fi-
nally, they have created or intensified relations with other civil-society organisa-
tions.
Unlike its Ghanaian counterpart, the Cameroonian trade-union movement has
failed to play any significant role during economie and political liberalisation,
largely due to the close links between the neo-patrimonial regime and the union
leadership. Even after the CCTU had fmally achieved a certain measure of auton-
omy during political liberalisation, the government continued to intervene in
trade-union matters for the purpose of political control and even sponsored the
foundation of a rival federation led by members of the ruling party. Moreover,
the CCTU has become almost completely paralysed by internal factional divi-
sions and struggles for power. One of the positive consequences of the two feder-
ations' blatant neglect of the defence of workers' interests has been the
emergence of militant autonomous trade unions in the public service, particularly
in the educational sector. Unsurprisingly, their leaders have been subjected to
persistent victimisation by the regime.
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